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Possession
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
Articles 3421 to 3444 of the Louisiana Civil Code establish the
substantive law governing possession.' These articles derive from the
reservoir of the civilian tradition and have, generally, counterparts in
modern civil codes.
In the 1982 revision of the laws governing possession, the redactors
relied heavily on the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
and on Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine. The innovations in this
field are few and relate mostly to terminology and style rather than
substance. 2 Perhaps the most important innovation is the possessory
protection accorded to precarious possessors against any person who
caused a disturbance of possession except the person for whom they
possess.'
This article is an effort at systematic analysis of the provisions of
the Louisiana Civil Code governing possession in the light of pre- and
post-revision jurisprudence and doctrine. Procedural institutions, includ-
ing the possessory action, have been discussed elsewhere; 4 reference to
procedural institutions is only made here when necessary for a better
understanding of the provisions of substantive law. For purposes of
comparison, brief reference is made to the legal systems of France,
Germany, and Greece.
NOTION, NATURE, AND KINDS OF POSSESSION
Definitions
In Louisiana legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine, the word pos-
session is used in at least three different senses. In the first place,
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1. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3421-3444.
2. See Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and
Acquisitive Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev. 69, 70 (1983).
3. See La. Civ. Code art. 3440.
4. See A. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law Property §§ 325-343 (3d ed. 1991).
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possession is used to denote a person's exercise of factual authority over
a thing with the intent to have that thing as his own.' Second, possession
is used to denote the exercise of factual authority over a thing by a
person who has no intent to have it as his own on behalf of another
person who does. 6 Third, possession is used to mean one's right to
possess.
7
For purposes of accurate analysis of legal institutions, the word
possession is used in this article to qualify, exclusively, the factual
authority that a person exercises over a corporeal thing with the intent
to own it or the corresponding authority that a person exercises over
a thing by virtue of a real right with the intent to have that right as
his own.' This is possession in the proper sense of the word.9
The word detention is used to denote, exclusively, the exercise of
factual authority over a thing without any pretension of ownership but
on behalf of a person who qualifies as possessor. 10 Thus, lessees, de-
positaries, and precarious possessors in general have detention rather
than possession."
The term right to possess is used, exclusively, to signify the right
of a possessor to be maintained in possession if he has
been disturbed and to be restored in possession of the property if he
has been evicted.' 2
Possession and Detention: Animus and Corpus
According to traditional civilian doctrine that is rooted in Roman
law, possession comprises two elements: the animus and the corpus.3
5. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 3424. Such a person is said to possess "as owner"
or to possess "for himself." See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424, 3438.
6. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 3437.
7. See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658.
8. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3421, 3424.
9. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3425, 3428, 3437. Cf. 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, Traitd
pratique de droit civil frangais 158 (2d ed. Picard 1952): "Possession is a state of fact
which consists in the detention of a thing in an exclusive manner and in the performance
on the thing of the material acts of use and enjoyment as if the possessor were owner."
10. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3421, 3425, 3437; id. arts. 3426, 3428 (1870); 3 M.
Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 175.
11. La. Civ. Code arts. 3428, 3429, 3437; id. arts. 3441, 3433 (1870); La. Code Civ.
P. art. 3656: "A predial lessee possesses for and in the name of his lessor, and not for
himself."
12. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3422, 3440, 3444; id. arts. 3434(2), 3454(2) (1870); Liner
v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975); Pitre v. Tenneco Oil
Co., 385 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 392 So. 2d 678 (1980).
The right to possess is "no prescriptive right, but a procedural assurance of the fact
of undisturbed possession." Todd v. State, Dep't of Natural Resources, 474 So. 2d 430,
438 (La. 1985).
13. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 161; Barton, Animus and possessio
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The corpus is material; it is the sum total of the facts that establish
physical control over a thing, that is, acts of use, detention, or enjoy-
ment. The animus is volitional; it is the intent of the person who exercises
physical control over a thing.
The volitional element of possession is often qualified in the civilian
literature as animus domini (intent to own) or as animus rem sibi habendi
(intent to have a thing as one's own). These terms, however, are not
of Roman origin. They have been coined by Savigny who asserted in
his celebrated treatise on possession that the intent to own the thing is
an indispensable element of possession in the proper sense of the word. 4
Savigny contrasted the animus domini with the animus detinendi,
that is, the intent to detain a thing on behalf of another person who
has the intent to own and qualifies as possessor. Thus, possession and
detention are distinct and distinguishable notions. One who exercises
physical control over a thing with the intent to own it has possession.
In contrast, one who exercises physical control over a thing on behalf
of another person has detention. Savigny's theory is known in the civilian
literature as the subjective theory of possession because of its reliance
on a person's subjective intent to own a thing. Jhering challenged this
theory and sought to demonstrate that the subjective intent of the person
who has physical control over a thing is implicit in his factual authority,
but it is not determinative for the qualification of that authority as
possession.'" Jhering's theory is known as the objective theory of pos-
session, because any intentional exercise of physical control over a thing
is possession.
Jhering distinguished between possession and detention, but he did
not ground the distinction on the presence or absence of the intent to
own the thing. According to Jhering, a person has detention rather than
possession when the causa possessionis (the "cause of possession") is
of a nature that implies exercise of physical control over a thing on
behalf of another person. When this happens, there can be no possession
in the proper sense of the word, and the causa possessionis becomes a
causa detentionis. Jhering asserted that when a court does not find that
nomine alieno, in New York Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property, Essays for
Barry Nicholas 43 (Birks ed. 1989). See also Georgiadis, in V Georgiadis and Stathopoulos,
Civil Code, Property art. 974 (1985) (in Greek).
14. See F. Savigny, Das Recht des Besitzes 110 (7th ed. Rudorff 1865). This famous
treatise has been translated into many languages, including French and English. See F.
Savigny's Treatise on Possession (6th ed. Perry transl. 1848); F. Savigny, Traitt de la
possession en droit romain (7th ed. Rudorff, Staedtler transl. 1870).
15. See R. Jhering, Ueber den Grund des Besitzschutzes 160 (1869). This famous
work has also been translated into many languages. See, e.g., R. Jhering, Sul Fondamento
della Protezione del Possesso (Forlani transl. 1872); R. Jhering, Role de la volont6 dans
la possession (Meulenaere transl. 1891).
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a person has detention, that person's possession ought to be regarded
as established by virtue of the objectively ascertainable signs of factual
authority.
Article 3421 of the Louisiana Civil Code, following corresponding
provisions of the 1870 Code and of the French Civil Code, appears to
confuse possession with detention. 6 This article defines possession as
the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing and does not mention
the intent to own. Article 3424 of the Louisiana Civil Code, however,
requires for the acquisition of possession the intent "to possess as
owner,' ' 7 and the second paragraph of Article 3421 requires for the
quasi-possession of a real right the intent "to have it as one's own."'"
These provisions are in pari materia and must be read together. Con-
sequently, one is bound to conclude that despite the confusing termi-
nology in Article 3421 of the Civil Code, there is a clear distinction
between possession and detention. A person who exercises physical con-
trol over a corporeal thing with the intent to own it, or a person who
exercises a real right with the intent to have it as his own, is a possessor.
A person who exercises physical control over a thing or a person who
exercises a real right on behalf of another person is a detainer.
Possession and Quasi-Possession
According to the Romanist tradition, possession in the proper sense
of the word is the physical control that a person exercises over a
corporeal thing with the intent to own: possessio rei animo domini or
rem sibi habendi.19 Following this tradition, Article 3421(1) of the Louis-
iana Civil Code declares: "Possession is the detention or enjoyment of
a corporeal thing, movable or immovable, that one holds or exercises
by himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name." '20
Strictly speaking, one may not possess a real right because one
cannot exercise physical acts over an incorporeal. However, one may
16. See La. Civ. Code art. 3421(1); id. La. Civ. Code art. 3426 (1870); Code Civil
[C. Civil] 2228 (Fr.).
17. See La. Civ. Code art. 3424.
18. See La. Civ. Code art. 3421(2). The expression "intent to possess as owner" has
the same meaning as "intent to possess for himself" and "intent to have the thing as
his own." See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424, 3438; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3656.
19. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 159; P. Huvelin, Cours 6lfmentaire
de droit romain 419 (1927); G. Balis, Civil Law Property 9 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); cf.
La. Civ. Code art. 3421.
20. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424, 3480; id. arts. 3436, 3451, 3452 (1870). Likewise,
Article 2228 of the French Civil Code declares that possession is "the detention or
enjoyment of a thing." The use of the word detention to define possession is confusing
and has been criticized. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 73; 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripen,
supra note 9, at 159.
[Vol. 51
POSSESSION
hold a real right with the intent to have it as his own. In Roman law
texts, the exercise of a right of servitude over another's immovable is
qualified as quasi-possessio or possessio juris.2' Following this tradition,
Article 3421(2) of the Louisiana Civil Code declares: "The exercise of
a real right, such as a servitude, with the intent to have it as one's
own is quasi-possession.''22
The distinction between possession and quasi-possession has mostly
doctrinal significance. The Louisiana Civil Code notes the distinction
for purposes of accurate analysis but does not establish special rules
applicable to quasi-possession as distinguished from possession. The rules
governing possession of corporeal things apply also to the quasi-pos-
session of real rights to the extent that their application is compatible
with their nature as incorporeals. 23 The Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure makes no distinction between possession and quasi-possession
insofar as possessory protection is concerned. It speaks of the
"possessor ' 24 of immovable property or of a real right therein. Following
established Louisiana practice, the word possession is used in this article
to designate both the possession of corporeal things and the quasi-
possession of real rights.
Corporeal Possession and Civil Possession
The exercise of factual authority over a thing by means of material
acts or constructions is qualified in Article 3425 of the Louisiana Civil
Code as "corporeal possession.' '25 The same article defines corporeal
possession as "the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or en-
joyment over a thing.1 26 The definition confuses possession with deten-
tion; however, there should be no doubt that corporeal possession may
only be exercised by one who possesses a thing with the intent to own.27
The requirement of possession as owner is, therefore, implicit in the
definition of corporeal possession.
21. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 159.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 3421; id. art. 3432 (1870); Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co.
v. Pousson, 262 La. 973, 265 So. 2d 756 (1972). For the quasi-possession of predial
servitudes, see Kizer v. Lilly, 471 So. 2d 716 (La. 1985); Symeonides, Developments in
the Law, Property, 46 La. L. Rev. 655, 671-80 (1986).
23. See La. Civ. Code art. 3421: "[T]he rules governing possession apply by analogy
to the quasi-possession of incorporeals."
24. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3655.
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 3425; id, art. 3436(2) (1870).
26. See La. Civ. Code art. 3425. See also Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841).
27. See La. Civ. Code art. 3424. Articles 3424 and 3425, being in pari materiae,
must be read together. See La. Civ. Code art. 13.
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To acquire possession, one must intend to possess as owner and
must take corporeal possession of the thing. 21 Once acquired, possession
is maintained by the intent to possess as owner, even if the possessor
ceases to possess corporeally. 29 In Louisiana, the retention of possession
merely by the intent to own the thing is termed "civil possession." 30
Acts, such as the payment of taxes assessed on an immovable, or the
execution of a juridical act affecting the thing, such as a lease, signify
civil possession. 3' Vestiges of works, such as fences, buildings, roads,
or other constructions may also signify civil possession. 2
With respect to corporeal things, civil possession is presumed to
exist and to last until possession is abandoned or the possessor is evicted
by another person. 33 Like ownership, which cannot be lost by non-use,
possession continues for an indeterminate period of time as civil pos-
session.34 However, civil possession may be affected by the vice of
discontinuity.35 Possession may be maintained by the intent to have the
thing as one's own for as long as the thing remains materially at the
disposal of the possessor. If an obstacle to the exercise of possession
arises, other than an irresistible force such as the inundation of a field,
28. See La. Civ. Code art. 3424; id. art. 3436 (1870); Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251
(1841).
29. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 169. See also Dig. XLI 2.2.7
(Digest of Justinian).
30. See La. Civ. Code art. 3431; Symeonides, supra note 2, at 80. The use of the
term "civil possession" to designate the preservation of possession merely by the intent
to own is a Louisiana innovation, established in Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841).
Possessio civilis did not have a well-defined meaning in Roman law. These words were
applicable to possession that carried legal consequences under the jus civile and led to
usucapio. See Savigny, supra note 14, at 71. Articles 3392 and 3394 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1825, like Articles 3429 and 3431 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870,
contained contradictory definitions of civil possession, inspired from the treatise of Pothier.
See 9 Ouevres de Pothier 269 (ed. Bugnet 1890); cf. Batiza, The Actual Sources of the
Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1, Ill (1972).
In Ellis v. Prevost, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the definition of civil
possession in Article 3392 of the 1825 Code and did away with the definition of civil
possession in Article 3394.
31. See La. Civ. Code art. 3431 comment (d); id. art. 3501 (1870).
32. See La. Civ. Code art. 3431 comment (d). But cf. Symeonides, supra note 2, at
81-82.
33. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3432, 3433; id. art. 3443 (1870).
34. Under Article 3444 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the presumption of
intent to retain possession ceased when the possessor failed to exercise actual possession
for ten years. Louisiana courts, however, frequently managed to avoid application of this
provision by finding that the possessor had exercised corporeal possession within a given
ten year period. See, e.g., Womack v. Walsh, 255 La. 217, 230 So. 2d 83 (1969). In the
1982 revision, the presumption that one intends to retain possession continues as long as
possession has not been abandoned or has been lost to another.
35. See La. Civ. Code art. 3435.
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possession may be lost despite the continued existence of the intent to
own.36
Strictly speaking, one may not have corporeal possession of a real
right because one cannot have physical control of an incorporeal. How-
ever, one may exercise a real right, such as a servitude, by means of
material acts or constructions. This form of exercise of a real right is
similar to the corporeal possession of a tract of land and produces the
same legal effects. 37 Likewise, the intent to have a real right as one's
own after the cessation of material acts or the removal of constructions
is similar to the civil possession of a corporeal immovable. 8
A question arises whether the provisions governing the civil pos-
session of corporeal immovables are also applicable to real rights other
than ownership. Determination of this question is important for a variety
of matters, including the protection of real rights other than ownership
by the possessory action in the absence of a title establishing the real
right.3 9 Article 3665 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the civil possession of mineral rights lasts for a maximum period
of one year after cessation of material acts of possession. ° Perhaps this
provision should be extended to apply to the civil possession of all real
rights other than ownership.
What constitutes corporeal possession depends largely on the nature
of the property that one claims to possess.4 ' For example, depending
on the nature of the land, the mowing of grass may or may not constitute
corporeal possession.4 2 A possessor with a title possesses within the limits
36. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 169.
37. Thus, one may acquire the right to possess a real right. See Kizer v. Lilly, 471
So. 2d 716 (La. 1985). Further, one may acquire a real right by acquisitive prescription.
See La. Civ. Code arts. 3473, 3486.
38. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3421, 3431, 3432; id. arts. 3429, 3431, 3442 (1870).
39. According to Louisiana jurisprudence, the rules governing possession apply by
analogy to the quasi-possession of incorporeals. See Kizer v. Lilly, 471 So. 2d 716 (La.
1985); Louisiana Irrigation and Mill Co. v. Pousson, 262 La. 973, 265 So. 2d 756 (1972);
Symeonides, supra note 22, at 671-80.
40. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3665. If there is adyerse possession, the owner of the
mineral right may bring the possessory action only within one year from the commencement
of such possession. Cf. id. art. 3666.
41. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Landry, 558 So. 2d 242 (La. 1990); Bossier v. Shell
Oil Co., 430 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983); Jones v. Pringle, 226 So. 2d 592 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1969); Chauvin v. Kirchhoff, 194 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967);
Kilchrist v. Conrad, 191 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
Cf. Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983). Riparian owners
claimed that they had corporeally possessed the bed of a non-navigable river by using
the river bed for recreational purposes, posting "keep-off" signs on the banks, and
removing sand from the river bed.
42. See Manzanares v. Meche, 506 So. 2d 957 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 508
So. 2d 822 (1987); Wagley v. Cross, 347 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). But cf.
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of his title, even if he does not exercise corporeal possession over the
entire tract of land.4 3 In contrast, a possessor without title is only in
possession of the area that he has possessed inch by inch or within
enclosures." The word enclosures does not necessarily mean fences. An
enclosure may be a natural or an artificial boundary that establishes
with certainty the limits of one's possession.4 5
Antis v. Miller, 524 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 271 (1988)
(mowing of grass not sufficient possession for the maintenance of a possessory action).
An occasional mowing of grass on neighboring property is not a disturbance of the
neighbor's possession. Richard v. Comeaux, 260 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
43. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3426, 3487. It makes no difference that the title is with
or without warranty. See Bossier v. Shell Oil Co., 430 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1983). When the property description in the title is not sufficiently clear to show the
limits to which one intends to possess, corporeal possession must be shown. Olinkraft,
Inc. v. Allen, 333 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
In Verzwyvelt v. Armstrong-Ratterree, Inc., 463 So. 2d 979 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985),
plaintiff produced a title containing expressly land lying under a non-navigable oxbow
lake that was formed when the Red River changed course and abandoned its old channel.
The court held that plaintiff's possession of the dry land within his title constituted
constructive possession of all the land contained therein, including the land covered with
water.
The possession of a described tract of land extends to include batture in the absence
of actual physical possession by someone else. River Lands Fleeting Corp. v. Ashland
Plantation, 498 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Hargrave, Developments in the Law
1986-1987, Property, 48 La. L. Rev. 457, 469-71 (1987).
44. See City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, Inc., 412 So. 2d 975 (La. 1981);
Alford v. Jarrell, 471 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); "[w]here a plaintiff claims
only by corporeal detention, without title, he must show an adverse possession within
enclosures." In Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983), the court
declared that, in the absence of title, possession must be proved "inch by inch" within
enclosures.
In Manzanares v. Meche, 506 So. 2d 957 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 508 So.
2d 822 (1987), the court was aware of the necessity of enclosures. Nevertheless, the court
found that plaintiff had possessed an unenclosed narrow strip of land adjacent to a
roadway.
45. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Landry, 558 So. 2d 242 (La. 1990) (a water-course
is an enclosure); Souther v. Domingue, 238 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
256 La. 891, 239 So. 2d 544 (1970); Jones v. Pringle, 226 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1969).
A painted line is an enclosure. Antulovich v. Whitley, 289 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1973); but cf. Olinkraft, Inc. v. Allen, 333 So. 2d 250 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976)
(repainting of the boundary line is not a sufficient corporeal possession to support the
possessory action). The placing of markers at the four corners of an immovable is not
an enclosure. Johnson v. LaBokay Corp., 326 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
A ditch may be a visible bound. Alvarez v. Hub City Iron Works, Inc., 405 So. 2d
590 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 763 (1982).
The toe of a levee may be a visible bound. Merchant v. Acadia-Vermilion Irrigation
Co., 476 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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Constructive Possession
A person who is in possession of a tract of land by virtue of a
title is deemed to have constructive possession within the limits of his
title even if he does not exercise any physical acts of use, detention,
or enjoyment.4 If he does exercise such acts over a part of the im-
movable, he is deemed to be in constructive possession of the remaining
part of the immovable.4 7 In the absence of title, one has possession only
of the area he actually possesses inch by inch or within enclosures.4 s
The title to which constructive possession attaches is an act translative
of ownership, such as a sale, an exchange, or a donation. This title
need not be valid in order to support a claim of constructive possession.4 9
Moreover, one may be in constructive possession regardless of his good
or bad faith.10
Things Susceptible of Possession
Corporeal things and real rights that qualify as private things5 are
susceptible of possession. Public things of the state and of its political
subdivisions are, generally, insusceptible of possession by private per-
sons." The state and its political subdivisions may grant to private
46. See Board of Comm'rs v. S.D. Hunter Foundation, 354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1977);
Bolding v. Eason Oil Co., 248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965); Jackson v. Bouanchaud,
178 La. 26, 150 So. 567 (1933); Ryan v. Pekinto, 387 So. 2d 1325 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980).
For constructive possession of alluvion formed beyond the limits of the riparian's title,
see Riverlands Fleeting Corp. v. Milliken and Farwell, 515 So. 2d 512 (La. App. lst. Cir.
1987); Riverlands Fleeting Corp. v. Ashland Plantation, 498 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986); Hargrave, supra note 43, at 469-71.
47. See La. Civ. Code art. 3426; Symeonides, supra note 2, at 76-81.
48. See La. Civ. Code art. 3426. Comment (d) under this article explains that actual
possession "must be either inch by inch possession (pedis possessio) or possession within
enclosures." Certain Louisiana courts, however, seem to require inch by inch possession
within enclosures.
49. See Marks v. Collier, 216 La. 1, 43 So. 2d 16 (1949). One may have constructive
corporeal possession or constructive civil possession. For functional implications, see
Symeonides, supra note 2, at 76.
50. See La. Civ. Code art. 3426 comment (b); id. art. 3487 comment (b).
51. See La. Civ. Code arts. 453, 454. It follows that a private person may institute
a possessory action against the state or a political subdivision of the state with respect
to things that are susceptible of possession by such a person. See Todd v. State, Dep't
of Nat. Res., 474 So. 2d 430 (La. 1985); Witter v. City of Baton Rouge, 546 So. 2d
848 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); Symeonides, Ruminations on Real Actions, 51 La. L. Rev.
493 (1991); Symeonides, supra note 22, at 655-70.
52. See La. Civ. Code arts. 450, 458; Bruning v. City of New Orleans, 165 La. 511,
115 So. 733 (1926); Keefe v. City of Monroe, 9 La. App. 545, 120 So. 102 (2d Cir.
1929).
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persons exclusive rights of use and enjoyment over public things.53 In
such a case, the grantee may be in possession of a real right that is
protected by the possessory action.5 4
Personal rights are not susceptible of possession. Lessees and de-
positaries who have physical control over a thing by virtue of personal
contracts are detainers rather than possessors. Expressions such as "pos-
session of an obligation" or "possession of status" are figures of
speech.55 It is only obligations embodied in an instrument to the bearer
that are susceptible of possession because such an instrument is a cor-
poreal thing. A universality of rights, such as a succession or an en-
terprise, is not susceptible of possession because it is not a thing.
Nature of Possession
The question concerning the nature of possession is an old one.
There are indications in the preparatory works of the French Civil Code
that possession was regarded as a real right.5 6 The French Civil Code,
however, as finally promulgated, is silent on this question. Under the
circumstances, controversies among French commentators with respect
to the nature of possession were to be expected.
Demolombe asserted last century that one's possession of a thing
with the intent to own it is a real right. 7 He grounded this assertion
on the observation that the rights accorded by law to possessors derive
from the presumption of ownership that Article 2279 of the French
Civil Code establishes rather than from the law governing personal
obligations. In contrast, Planiol insisted that possession is a matter of
fact and criticized as erroneous the view that possession is a juridical
institution." Such an institution is the means that the law employs for
the protection or suppression of a matter of fact. The fact of possession
is generally protected by the law, though not always. In certain circum-
53. See La. Civ. Code art. 723; A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, § 8 in 4
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1983); cf. City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal,
Inc., 412 So. 2d 975 (La. 1981), rev'd on reh'g (1982); Giardina v. Marrero Furniture
Co., 310 So. 2d 607 (La. 1975); State ex rel. Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So.
812 (1928); 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 160.
54. See Parkway Dev. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 342 So. 2d 151 (La. 1977). A
private person may, exceptionally, have actual or constructive possession of a navigable
water body. See St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 167 So. 2d 509 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 246 La. 908, 168 So. 2d 821 (1964).
55. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 161.
56. See 3 P. Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux pr6paratoires du Code Civil 459-60
(1836).
57. See 9 C. Demolombe, Traitd de la distinction de biens 366 in Cours de Code
Napoleon (1874-82).
58. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 159 n.2.
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stances, the law withdraws possessory protection in order to safeguard
the right of ownership.
Controversies concerning the nature of possession may be interesting
from the viewpoint of legal philosophy but do not involve practical
consequences in Louisiana. Article 3422 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which has no equivalent in the French Civil Code, declares that pos-
session is "a matter of fact; nevertheless, one who has possessed a thing
for over a year acquires the right to possess it." 9 This article indicates
that possession, a fact that is recognized and protected by the law, gives
rise to the right to possess, a sui generis right that is neither personal
nor real. This view accords with the historical sources of the Louisiana
Civil Code and with contemporary continental doctrine.6
Rights of Possessors
Possession is a matter of fact to which the law attaches significant
legal consequences. Article 3422 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares
that a person who has possessed a thing for over a year acquires the
right to possess it.61 This right entitles a possessor of immovable property
to protection by the nominate possessory action of Article 3655 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.62 Exceptionally, however, a possessor
of immovable property is entitled to institute the possessory action even
if he did not acquire the right to possess. This happens when such a
possessor is evicted by force or fraud.63 The possession of movables is
protected by an innominate civil action."
Article 3423 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that a possessor
is considered provisionally as owner of the thing he possesses, that is,
until another person's ownership is established. 65 This is a presumption
59. La. Civ. Code art. 3422; id. art. 3434 (1870). For the distinction between possession
and the right to possess, see also Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 319 So.
2d 766 (La. 1975).
60. See Wolff-Raiser, Sachenrecht 19 (10th ed. 1957); G. Balis, supra note 19, at 3-
7; but cf. 2 Maasdorp's Institutes of South African Law, The Law of Things 16 (7th
ed. 1960) (possession termed a "real right").
61. See La. Civ. Code art. 3422. The right to possess is a sui generis property right.
This right is protected by Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Thus, the possessor
of a stray cat may sue for damages when the cat is destroyed through the fault of another
person. See Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979).
62. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3655.
63. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658(2). In this instance, the possessory action protects
possession rather than the right to possess in the interest of preservation of public peace.
Id. art. 3655.
64. See La. Civ. Code art. 3444.
65. See La. Civ. Code art. 3423. See also La. Civ. Code art. 530.
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of ownership accorded by the law to a person who exercises factual
authority over a thing,6 movable or immovable.67 Therefore, when a
petitory action is instituted against a person in possession of immovable
property, or when a revendicatory action is instituted against a person
in possession of a movable, the burden of proof of ownership rests on
the plaintiff. 68
Possession leads to acquisitive prescription.69 A possessor in good
faith may acquire ownership of movables in three years, and of im-
movables in ten years. A possessor in bad faith may acquire ownership
of movables in ten years, and of immovables in thirty years. Scattered
provisions in the Civil Code govern a possessor's right to fruits, re-
imbursement for expenses and improvements, and his right to retain the
thing until he is reimbursed. 70 These rights are accorded to possessors
regardless of the duration of their possession.
Comparative Law
In Louisiana and in France, the legal institution of possession has
been structured around three basic ideas. First, the intent to possess as
owner is an indispensable requirement for possession. 71 In the absence
of such an intent, the exercise of factual authority over a thing is
detention rather than possession. Second, possession applies to corporeal
things and real rights only.72 Personal rights are not susceptible of
possession. Third, though distinct and distinguishable from ownership,
possession is linked to ownership by a presumption that a possessor is
provisionally considered to be owner of the thing he possesses until the
right of the true owner is established. 73 The institutionalization of pos-
session within the framework of these ideas has been criticized as having
resulted in a rather narrow conception of possession in comparison with
that of modern civil codes. 74
66. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 182. The presumption of ownership
under Article 3423 of the Louisiana Civil Code is accorded to a possessor even before
he has acquired the right to possess. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 94.
67. For movables, see also La. Civ. Code art. 530.
68. See La. Civ. Code art. 531; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653.
69. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3473-3491.
70. See La. Civ. Code arts. 486, 488, 496, 497, 527-529.
71. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3421, 3424.
72. See La. Civ. Code art. 3421.
73. See La. Civ. Code art. 3423. See also 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, Droit civil franqais
117 n.4 (7th ed. 1961): "[Wjhat the law protects is the probable right of ownership or
servitude, the existence of which it assumes, rather than possession itself."
74. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 163.
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In Germany, possession is the exercise of factual authority over a
corporeal thing (Sachbesitz) .7  The intent to possess as owner is not an
indispensable requirement for possession. Any person who exercises fac-
tual authority over a thing is a possessor, even if he exercises that
authority on behalf of another person. Thus, a lessee or a depositary
is a possessor. Nevertheless, a distinction is drawn between a person
who possesses as owner (Eigenbesitzer) and a person who lacks that
intent (Fremdbesitzer).7 6 This distinction is pertinent for acquisitive pre-
scription, because prescriptive rights accrue only in favor of a possessor
who possesses as owner. Possessory protection is accorded to both a
possessor who possesses as owner and a possessor who possesses on
behalf of another person.
Several persons may be simultaneously in possession of the same
thing. In this respect, a distinction is drawn between direct possession
and indirect possession. A person who possesses a thing as usufructuary,
pledgee, lessee, depositary, or under a similar relationship that establishes
a right or obligation to possess for a period of time is a direct possessor.7
Normally, the owner of the thing subject to usufruct, pledge, lease,
deposit, or similar relationship is the indirect possessor. A thing may
be subject to several layers of direct and indirect possession. When, for
example, a lessee executes a sublease, the lessor and the lessee are indirect
possessors and the sublessee is the direct possessor.7 8
Despite the elimination of intent to own as a requisite for possession,
the German Civil Code has not completely dispensed with the notion
of detention. Certain persons may exercise factual authority over a thing
without being possessors. A person who exercises factual authority over
a thing on behalf of another person in that person's household or place
of business, or elsewhere under a similar relationship that obligates him
to conform to instructions with respect to the thing, is a detainer known
as possession-helper (Besitzdiener).7 9 In such a case, possessor is the
person for whom the possession-helper exercises factual authority. The
distinction between an indirect possessor and a possession-helper is not
always easy to draw. For example, depending on the circumstances, a
spouse or a mandatary may qualify both as a possession-helper and an
indirect possessor.
75. See Buirgerliches Gesetzbuich [BGB] § 854. Under the German Civil Code, a thing
is a corporeal object. See BGB § 90. The German Civil Code leaves no room for the
notion of quasi-possession of real rights. However, such rights are protected by the
possessory action. See BGB § 1029 (servitudes).
76. See BGB § 872.
77. See BGB § 868.
78. See BGB § 871.
79. See BGB § 855.
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The Greek Civil Code has been, generally, patterned after the model
of the German Civil Code, but the institution of possession has been
structured within the conceptual framework of the Roman-Byzantine
tradition. In accord with the Romanist doctrine, the Greek Civil Code
has preserved the distinction between possession and detention. A pos-
sessor is a person who exercises factual authority over a corporeal thing
with the mind of an owner. 0 In the absence of such an intent, there
is detention rather than possession. The Greek Civil Code has also
preserved the notion of quasi-possession. Article 975 declares that with
respect to the rights of pledge and servitudes, possession consists in the
exercise of these rights with the mind of a person entitled to these
rights.
The code contains detailed provisions governing the acquisition,
exercise, transfer, and loss of possession."' The German influence, though
limited, is still apparent. Detailed provisions governing possessory pro-
tection reflect the German approach, and Article 986 introduces the
notion of possession helpers and grants them the right to exercise self-
help for the suppression of disturbances of possession. 2
The German conceptions of possession did not influence the 1982
revision of the Louisiana Civil Code. The Romanist tradition was firmly
established in Louisiana, and it has proved to be sound and functional.
As in France, innovation was necessary only for the protection of
precarious possessors, and this was easy to accomplish within the existing
conceptual framework.
Acquisition of Possession and of the Right to Possess
A person acquires possession when he exercises physical control over
a thing with the intent to have it as his own. 3 In civilian terminology,
possession is acquired upon the concurrence of its two constituent el-
ements, the corpus and the animus.Y
The corpus is acquired either as a result of unilateral acts of use,
detention, or enjoyment over a thing or as a result of relinquishment
of possession by a previous possessor. The acquisition of possession,
like the acquisition of ownership, may be original or derivative. It is
original when a person commences to possess for himself without regard
80. See Greek Civ. Code art. 974; Georgiadis, supra note 13; G. Balis, supra note
19, at 3-85.
81. See Greek Civ. Code arts. 976-983.
82. See Greek Civ. Code arts. 984-998.
83. See La. Civ. Code art. 3424; id. art. 3436 (1870); 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert,
supra note 9, at 166; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 119.
84. See D. 41.2.3 § 1: "Elpiscimur possessionem corpore et animo, neque per se
animo, out per se corpore."
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to any other person's possession. It is derivative when a person acquires
possession by a transfer from another person.
The animus is, ordinarily, inferred from the exercise of physical
control over a thing or from certain juridical acts or facts that imply
its existence, such as a tradition brevi manu and a constitutum posses-
sorium. A tradition brevi manu takes place when a precarious possessor,
by virtue of an agreement with the possessor, commences to possess
for himself.8 5 This happens, for example, when a lessor sells the leased
property to the lessee. There is a constitutum possessorium when a
possessor agrees to exercise possession for another person.8 This happens
when a thing is sold and the vendor agrees to keep the thing for the
purchaser or when an owner transfers ownership and retains a usufruct.
In France and in Louisiana, the intent to possess does not alone
suffice for acquisition of possession. Article 3424 of the Louisiana Civil
Code declares: "To acquire possession, one must intend to possess as
owner and must take corporeal possession of the thing. 8 7 This provision
contemplates, primarily, the commencement of an original possession.
When the acquisition of possession is derivative, the transferee need not
take corporeal possession; his intent to possess the thing, that is, his
civil possession, is tacked onto the transferor's corporeal possession. 8
Acquisition of possession through another person. Article 3428 of
the Louisiana Civil Code declares that one may acquire possession of
a thing "through another who takes it for him and in his name." 9 In
such a case, the person who exercises physical control over the thing
supplies the material element of possession, the corpus. The volitional
element, the animus, must exist in the mind of the person for whom
possession is acquired. The Civil Code requires that the person taking
possession "must intend to do so for another."' 9 If he lacks that intent,
he would be presumed to possess for himself. A person who acquires
possession for another is a precarious possessor.
85. See G. Balis, supra note 19, at 15; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at
121. See also F. Savigny, supra note 14, at 243.
86. See G. Balis, supra note 19, at 21; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at
121.
87. La. Civ. Code art. 3424; id. art. 3436 (1870). A person may acquire possession
over a thing that no one else possesses or over a thing that somebody else possesses. If
possession is not acquired with the consent of the person having possession, there is an
eviction or usurpation of another's possession.
88. See La. Civ. Code art. 3424 comment (c); Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841).
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 3441-3443.
89. La. Civ. Code art. 3428; id. arts. 3438, 3445 (1870); C. Civ. art. 2228 (Fr.). In
civilian terminology, possession may always be acquired, and maintained, corpore alieno.
See Dig. 41.2.3. § 12: "Possessionem acquirimus et animo et corpore; animo utique nostro,
corpore vel nostro, vel alieno."
90. La. Civ. Code art. 3428.
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Incompetents may acquire possession by their own acts and intent
or through their legal representatives. 9 Article 3439 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 stated that "a natural person who labors under
some incapacity may acquire possession through his tutor or curator."
This provision was not reproduced in the 1982 revision because it was
unnecessary. Since possession is a matter of fact, capacity to enter into
juridical acts is not required for original acquisition of possession.
Incompetents may take, therefore, possession of a thing without the
consent of their tutors or curators.92 However, tutors and curators may
also take possession, whether original or derivative, for the incompetents
they represent. 93 Juridical persons acquire possession through their legal
representatives. 94
Acquisition of the right to possess. Article 3422 of the Louisiana
Civil Code declares that a person "who has possessed a thing for over
a year acquires the right to possess." The right to possess signifies a
possession protected by the possessory action.9 Possession, as factual
authority over a thing, is distinguishable from the right to possess, that
is, a possessor's claim to remain in undisturbed possession if he has
been disturbed and to be restored to the possession of the property if
he has been evicted. These ends are achieved by the possessory action
which has been designed to protect the right to possess and exceptionally
the factual authority over a thing."
For acquisition of the right to possess, the possession must be
corporeal at its inception, uninterrupted, and free of vice. 97 A precarious
possession cannot acquire the right to possess while he exercises pos-
session for another person; however, a precarious possessor may institute
a possessory action against any one who disturbs his enjoyment except
the person for whom he possesses. 9 When a precarious possessor gives
notice that he intends to possess for himself, there is a concurrence of
91. See La. Civ. Code, Book III, Title XXIII, Occupancy and Possession, Expos6
des Motifs 48, 50 (Supp. 1990).
92. Cf. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 83. Of course, an incompetent who lacks the
ability to form the intent to own a thing cannot acquire possession. Id.
93. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 167: "On principle, the volitional
element must exist in the person who must possess; the will of another person cannot
make us possessors. However, for persons incapable of having an animus of their own,
such as children and insane persons, we must admit that they acquire possession through
the intent of another person; they borrow, in a way, the animus of their representatives."
94. See La. Civ. Code art. 3430; id. art. 3440 (1870).
95. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 94.
96. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658(2). The mere factual authority of less than one
year's duration is protected in case of fraudulent or violent eviction. Id. For the protection
of precarious possession, see La. Civ. Code art. 3440.
97. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658(2).
98. See La. Civ. Code art. 3440.
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corpus and animus, and one year later the former precarious possessor
acquires the right to possess. 99
Like the possessor of a corporeal immovable, the possessor of a
real right may acquire the right to possess. The law does not require
exercise of the real right for an entire year; constructive possession or
civil possession preceded by corporeal possession suffices.' ° The re-
quirement of continuity of possession is satisfied when a real right is
used regularly according to its nature.101
The institution of a possessory action against a person who usurped
another's possession prevents the defendant from acquiring the right to
possess. According to Article 3462 of the Louisiana Civil Code, pre-
scription is interrupted when the owner commences action against the
possessor. 0 2 This provision should be applied by analogy to a possessory
action.
Possession as Owner
A possessor in the proper sense of the word is a person who possesses
as owner, 03 that is, has the intent to own a corporeal thing or the
intent to have as his own a real right in another person's property.'04
A person who lacks that intent is either a precarious possessor 05 or no
possessor at all.
99. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3439, 3478; Satsuma Pentecostal Church v. Harris, 563
So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
100. See Parkway Dev. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 342 So. 2d 151 (La. 1977).
101. See Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co. v. Pousson, 262 La. 913, 265 So. 2d 756
(1971). See also A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 53, at § 181.
102. See La. Civ. Code art. 3462; cf. Jones v. Skannal, 384 So. 2d 492 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1980). The right to possess is not acquired by means of acquisitive prescription.
See Todd v. State, Dept. of Natural Resources, 474 So. 2d 430, 438 (1985). The court
declared that the right to possess is "no prescriptive right, but a procedural assurance
of the fact of undisturbed possession." Nevertheless, the filing of a suit by an evicted
possessor should prevent the person who usurped plaintiff's possession from acquiring
the right to possess during the pendency of the action.
103. See La. Civ. Code art. 3424; Symeonides, supra note 2, at 73; Comment, Pos-
session, the 1982 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 573, 575 (1983).
For what constitutes possession as owner, see City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal,
Inc., 412 So. 2d 975 (La. 1981), rev'd on reh'g (1982); Hammond v. Averett, 415 So.
2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Harper v. Willis, 383 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 390 So. 2d 202 (1980). In Oliver v. Kennington, 458 So. 2d 130 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 610 (1984), the court held that the occasional cutting
of timber from an isolated tract of land is not proof of actual possession as owner.
104. The expressions "possesses as owner," "possesses for himself," or "possesses
with the intent to have it [the thing] as his own" have the same meaning. Cf. La. Civ.
Code arts. 3421, 3424, 3438; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3656.
105. See La. Civ. Code art. 3437. In contemporary civil law systems, precarious
possession is qualified as detention.
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The benefits of possession are generally attributed to a person who
possesses as owner. 1°6 By way of exception, however, a precarious pos-
sessor enjoys limited possessory protection. According to Article 3440
of the Louisiana Civil Code, the possessory action is available to a
precarious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, against anyone
who causes a disturbance of possession except the person for whom he
possesses. 107 Therefore, it is important to determine whether the plaintiff
in a possessory action possesses as owner or for another person.
The intent to possess as owner is not necessarily a specific and
conscious intent to own a thing. A general intent may suffice, at least
as to things that are destined to be possessed and are placed in a space
relationship suitable for the exercise of possession. For example, the
addressee is in possession of his mail even before he acquires knowledge
that the mail has been deposited in his box. 08
The possessor's intent to possess as owner is presumed, unless he
began to possess in the name of and for another, in which case the
presumption does not arise. °9 When the presumption arises, it may be
rebutted by any of the parties. °10 Occasionally, a party's own admissions
106. See La. Civ. Code art. 3423; id. arts. 486, 488, 527-529. For the question whether
a surviving spouse in community enjoys de jure possession of his undivided share of the
community, see Gauthier v. Gauthier, 502 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Succession
of Dunham, 428 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). For the requirement of "possession
as owner" in the framework of the community property regime, see Hargrave, supra note
43, at 465-69.
107. See La. Civ. Code art. 3440. In the past, the possessory action could be instituted
only by a person who possessed as owner; a precarious possessor could not be plaintiff
in a possessory action. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 3656; Dutile v. Aymond, 338 So. 2d
350 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). La. Code Civ. P. art. 3556 has been impliedly repealed to
the extent that it conflicts with La. Civ. Code art. 3440.
108. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 163.
109. See La. Civ. Code art. 3427; C. Civ. art. 2230 (Fr.); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Landry, 558 So. 2d 242 (La. 1990); Williams v. McEacharn, 464 So. 2d 20 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1985); Freeman v. Williams, 450 So. 2d 1030 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Mulkey
v. Cate, 424 So. 2d 1098 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied, 429 So. 2d 144 (1983).
In Harvill v. Casey, 461 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 464 So. 2d
318 (1985), the presumption did not arise because the person claiming possession was a
relative who had possessed for himself and his co-owners. In Chaney v. State Mineral
Board, 444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983), the court declared that use of the river bed for
recreational purposes, posting "keep-off" signs on the banks, and removing sand from
the river bed were not indicative of possession of the river bed with the intent to own
it. It would seem that plaintiffs were entitled to rest on the presumption of La. Civ.
Code art. 3427 but failed to prove acts of corporeal possession. The two requisites for
possessory protection are distinct and distinguishable; they should not be confused.
110. See Levy v. Germania Plantation, Inc., 395 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
However, the person who claims that he has the possession of a thing does not have the
burden of proof that he possesses as owner; it is for the opposing party to show that
his adversary possesses for another or he is no possessor at all.
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result in rebuttal of the presumption to possess as owner."' A person
who began to possess for another is not presumed to possess for himself;
on the contrary, he is presumed to be a precarious possessor although
he may actually intend to possess for himself. 12
A person who has a real right on another's immovable, such as a
personal servitude or a predial servitude, possesses the real right with
the intent to have it as his own.' However, he does not possess the
immovable that is burdened with his real right because he has no intent
to own that immovable. He exercises physical acts of use, detention,
or enjoyment over the immovable, but as a precarious possessor. His
acts of possession benefit the person from whom he acquired his real
right." 4 In accord, Article 3660(2) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure declares that a person who claims the ownership of immovable
property "possesses""' through a person who has the use or usufruct
of the immovable. One may, therefore, conclude that the holder of a
real right possesses that right for himself and is a detainer rather than
possessor of the immovable." 6
111. In Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So. 2d 1087 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), the defendant
rendered his possession precarious by acknowledging before witnesses that the fence
enclosing his property was erroneously placed at a point beyond the limits of his title
thus enclosing partly the land of his neighbor. In Comeaux v. Davenport, 452 So. 2d
818, 821 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), plaintiff signed a lease from the record owners of the
disputed property after having possessed it adversely as owner for 23 years. Had this
lease been valid, it would have constituted an acknowledgment capable of rendering
subsequent possession precarious. However, after expressing "serious misgivings regarding
the validity of plaintiff's consent" because he could not read and did not know what he
was signing, the court declared the lease invalid because, of the two co-owners named
as lessors in the lease document, only one had signed it.
In Williams, 464 So. 2d 20, the court held that a declaration against interest after
adverse possession that lasted for more than thirty years "is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of possession as owner ... which possession as owner is also established
by the lengthy use of the property." Id. at 24.
112. See La. Civ. Code art. 3438.
113. See La. Civ. Code art. 3421 para. 2. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 3656: "A
person entitled to the use or usufruct of immovable property, and one who has a real
right therein, possesses for himself."
114. See Board of Comm'rs of the Caddo Levee Dist. v. S.D. Hunter Foundation,
354 So. 2d 156 (La. 1977); Manson Realty Co. v. Plaisance, 196 So. 2d 555 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967).
115. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3660 para. 2. See also id art. 3656 comment (b): "A
person who is entitled to the use or usufruct possesses the property or right both for
himself and for the naked owner, and hence either may bring the possessory action."
116. See A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 53, at § 179. In Faust v. Mitchell Energy Corp.,
437 So. 2d 339, 343 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983), the court properly held that the holder of
a real right, a Cemetery Association, had possession for "cemetery purposes only" and
did not have possession of the land.
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Exercise of Possession by Another
Possession may be maintained through the acts of another person.
Article 3429 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that possession "may
be exercised by the possessor or by another who holds the thing for
him and in his name. Thus a lessor possesses through the lessee." A
lessor ceases to exercise factual authority over the leased property; but,
since the lessee detains the property for the lessor, the latter continues
to enjoy all the benefits of possession. The lessor may continue to
execute juridical acts with respect to the leased premises and perform
acts indicative of civil possession, such as the payment of taxes. However,
material acts of use, detention, and enjoyment are performed by another
person. In civilian terminology, the lessor possesses corpore alieno." 7
A person who exercises possession for another is a precarious pos-
sessor. This person has the detention of the property rather than pos-
session in the proper sense of the word.
Loss of Possession and of the Right to Possess
Civil law doctrine. According to civilian doctrine, possession may
be lost as a result of the loss of the corpus, of the animus, or of both
elements. "'
Quite frequently, possession is lost by a simultaneous loss of factual
authority and termination of the intent to possess as owner. This happens
when the possessor of an immovable gives up his possession of a disputed
strip of land at the boundary. This also happens when the possessor
of a movable abandons it or throws it away, as in the case of favors
thrown from a Mardi Gras parade." 9
Possession may also be lost as a result of the loss of the factual
authority over a thing despite the continuous existence of the intent to
possess as owner. This happens when a person usurps another's pos-
session, when a thing is destroyed, or when a wild animal recovers its
natural liberty.'2 In such cases, the person who had possession still has
the intent to possess as owner, but he cannot exercise acts of use,
detention, or enjoyment over a thing.
117. See 3 M. Planiol et 0. Ripert, supra note 9, at 168.
118. Id. at 167; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 123; G. Balis, supra note
19, at 34.
119. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 3418: "A thing is abandoned when its owner relinquishes
possession with the intent to give up ownership." Things thrown from Roman parades
were known as jacta missilia. See Dig. 41.1.9.7: "qui missilia jactat in vulgus" In such
cases, there is a simultaneous loss of the corpus and the animus.
120. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 3414. This provision speaks of loss of ownership but it
applies, a fortiori, to the loss of possession. In such a case, there is loss of possession
as a result of loss of the corpus alone.
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Finally, possession may be lost when the possessor ceases to possess
as owner but continues to exercise factual authority over the thing. A
typical example is that of a vendor who has agreed to keep the thing
in the name and on behalf of the purchaser. In such a case, the vendor
becomes a precarious possessor and the transaction is termed a consti-
tutum possessorium.12 '
Louisiana Civil Code. Article 3433 of the Louisiana Civil Code
provides that possession is lost "when the possessor manifests his in-
tention to abandon it or when he is evicted by another by force or
usurpation." This article contemplates a loss of possession either as a
result of the loss of the animus or as a result of the loss of both the
animus and the corpus. Article 3433 does not cover the loss of possession
as a result of the corpus alone, as in the case of destruction of a thing,
because this is a matter of general principle rather than positive law.
The two modes of loss of possession covered by Article 3433 are a
unilateral abandonment of possession by the possessor and an eviction
or usurpation perpetrated by another person who commenced to possess
for himself. The transfer of possession by one possessor to another does
not entail a loss of possession. The former possessor ceases to possess
but possession is continued by the transferee who benefits by tacking.'"
What constitutes an abandonment of possession is a question of
fact that is determined in light of all the circumstances. Ordinarily,
abandonment of possession is established when the possessor manifests
his intent by overt and unambiguous acts, for example, by throwing
away a movable thing. The intent to abandon is subjective, but its
existence may be established in light of objective considerations.
An eviction from possession or usurpation occurs when a person
takes corporeal possession of a thing that was in another's possession.12, 3
It is distinguished from a mere disturbance of possession that falls short
of eviction; possession is lost not when a possessor is merely disturbed
in his possession but when he is evicted.' u What constitutes an eviction
121. See G. Balls, supra note 19, at 21; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at
121.
122. La. Civ. Code art. 3433 comment (b); id. art. 3442.
123. An eviction or usurpation is a disturbance in fact. See La. Code Civ. P. art.
3659. It is a maxim of Roman law that two persons cannot possess simultaneously the
same thing. Therefore, it is only upon the eviction of the previous possessor that the
new possessor commences to possess. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424-3425.
124. See Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975).
See also Norton v. Addie, 337 So. 2d 432 (La. 1976) (occasional hunting; no eviction);
Boneno v. Lasseigne, 534 So. 2d 968 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (pile driving in batture);
Gaulter v. Gennaro, 345 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977) (picking of berries and
pecans).
A series of disturbances in fact does not necessarily result in usurpation of one's
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is a question of fact determined, like abandonment of possession, in
light of all the circumstances. Ordinarily, the erection of a fence or
other enclosure,25 or the use of the property according to its nature by
a person claiming it adversely to the possessor, 26 is an eviction. However,
acts of simple tolerance, such as an occasional mowing of grass across
the boundary of adjacent tracts of land, do not constitute an eviction. 27
Corporeal, civil, or constructive possession is lost as a result of the
corporeal possession of the same thing by another person. However,
acts of civil possession cannot result in the loss of another's corporeal
or civil possession, and a mere constructive possession cannot oust
another's corporeal, civil, or constructive possession. 28 Likewise, a dis-
turbance in law cannot be an eviction.
29
possession. See Richard v. Comeaux, 260 So. 2d 350, 354 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). In
Meche v. Graham, 421 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), the court held that the
placement of stakes along a disputed boundary did not suffice to usurp possession. In
other words, the placement of stakes was considered by the court as a mere disturbance
of possession rather than eviction.
There is no eviction when property is surveyed and lines are marked on the ground.
Mcllwain v. Manville Forest Products Corp., 499 So. 2d 1138 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986);
Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co., 385 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 392 So. 2d
678 (1980); Holliday v. Continental Can Co., 351 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977).
125. See Hongo v. Carlton, 241 So. 2d 34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Kilchrist v.
Conrad, 191 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
126. See La. Civ. Code art. 3433 comment (d).
127. See Richard v. Comeaux, 260 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). Once possession
has been acquired, however, mowing of the grass may constitute sufficient corporeal
possession. See also Wagley v. Cross, 347 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). Cf. La.
Civ. Code art. 3490 (1870). This provision declared: "The circumstance of having been
in possession by the permission or through the indulgence of another person, gives neither
legal possession nor the right of prescribing." Plenty has been lost in the translation from
the French text of art. 3456 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, same as art. 2232 of
the Code Napoleon: "Les acts de pure facult6 et ceux de simple tolerance, ne peuvent
fonder ni possession ni prescription" (acts that are the exercise of a prerogative, and
those of simple tolerance, cannot be the foundation of either possession or prescription).
The provision has not been reproduced in the 1982 revision because it is self-evident.
128. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424, 3425; Oliver v. Kennington, 458 So. 2d 130 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 610 (1984); Souther v. Domingue, 238 So. 2d
264 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 256 La. 891, 239 So. 2d 544 (1970).
In Whitley v. Texaco, Inc., 434 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), on rehearing, the
court held that of two conflicting constructive possessions the one first established prevails,
since once established, possession is ousted only by adverse corporeal, not constructive
possession. For discussion, see Symeonides, Developments in the Law, 1982-83, Property,
44 La. L. Rev. 505, 513-515 (1983); Note, Property: Conflicting Constructive and Civil
Possessions, 45 La. L. Rev. 979 (1985).
129. See Chauvin v. Kirchhoff, 194 So. 2d 805, 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967). See
also Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 261 La. 502, 521, 260 So. 2d 307, 314 (1972) (Tate, J.,
concurring): "Although the recordation itself is a disturbance in law for such purpose,
the prior jurisprudence never held such 'disturbance in law' by mere recordation to be
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Interruption of possession; loss of the right to possess. The loss of
possession is distinguished from the interruption of possession. Under
Article 3658(2) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, possessory
protection is available to a possessor who had possession "without
interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the distur-
bance."10 The Code of Civil Procedure does not determine what con-
stitutes an interruption of possession. However, Article 3434 of the
Louisiana Civil Code declares that possession is interrupted "when the
right to possess is lost." This right is lost upon abandonment of pos-
session, and, in case of eviction, if the possessor does not recover
possession within a year of the eviction. 3 ' If the possessor recovers
possession within one year, or if he recovers possession later as a result
of an action brought within the year, the interruption of possession is
considered never to have occurred.
3 2
Loss of the possession of real rights. The possession of a real right
other than ownership is lost when another person exercises the right
according to its nature with the intent to have it as his own. In such
a case, there is a usurpation of the possession of the real right that
corresponds with an eviction from the possession of a corporeal thing.
The possession of a real right other than ownership may also be
lost when the property burdened with such a right is in the possession
a sufficient interruption of possession to prevent the physical possessor of property from
being nevertheless considered to be 'possession quietly and without interruption,' La.C.Civ.P.
Art. 3658(2)."
130. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658(2). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 3442, 3476. La. Civ.
Code art. 3442 requires uninterrupted possession for tacking, and Article 3476 requires
uninterrupted possession for acquisitive prescription. Interruption of possession is also
distinguishable from interruption of acquisitive prescription. Possession is interrupted when
the right to possess is lost. See infra text accompanying note 131. Acquisitive prescription
is interrupted when possession is lost. See La. Civ. Code art. 3465.
131. La. Civ. Code art. 3465. See also Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.,
319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975). Mire v. Crowe, 439 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983),
contains an excellent discussion of the requirements for the possessory action and spe-
cifically the loss of the right to possess. Plaintiff was in possession for a number of
years. Defendant disturbed his possession by occasionally walking through, hunting, and
fishing on the disputed property. Held: These isolated disturbances-in-fact gave rise to
possessory actions which, if brought timely, might entitle plaintiff to damages. However,
failure to bring possessory action timely would not cause loss of the right to possess.
For a disturbance to cause loss of the right to possess, it must amount to eviction, i.e.,
in the court's words, "it must bring home to the actual possessor the realization that his
dominion is being seriously challenged," and must last for more than a year. Id. at 522.
See also Boise Southern Co. v. Stanfield, 509 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
510 So. 2d 376 (1987) (plaintiff had the right to possess and did not lose it in the year
prior to the disturbance).
132. See La. Civ. Code art. 3456. This provision is in pari materia with Article 3434
and is applicable to interruption of possession as well as to interruption of acquisitive
prescription. See O'Quinn v. Haas Inv. Co., 458 So. 2d 612 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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of an adverse possessor. The possession of an immovable by the adverse
possessor is not necessarily adverse to the possession of the real right.
Depending on facts and circumstances, the adverse possession of the
immovable may be compatible with the possession of the real right, it
may be a mere disturbance of the possession of the real right, or it
may amount to a usurpation of the real right. The person entitled to
the possession of the real right loses possession only in the last case,
namely when the adverse possessor usurps the possession of the real
right and possesses the immovable as if it were free of the burden. This
happens when the adverse possessor of the immovable performs material
acts of use, detention, or enjoyment or when he erects constructions
that contravene the possession of the real right. In such a case, the
acts and constructions mark the commencement of an adverse possession
of both the immovable and the real right burdening it.
The possession of a real right other than ownership may also be
lost upon the lapse of one year from the last use of the right by means
of material acts or constructions. If the immovable is in the possession
of an adverse possessor, that possessor commences to possess the im-
movable as if it were free of the burden from the date of the last use
of the real right. Thereafter, if the non-use continues for ten years, the
right itself is extinguished by the prescription of non-use.'33
Special rules apply to the loss of the possession of a mineral right
when the immovable burdened with it is in the hands of an adverse
possessor. The possession of the surface may or may not include the
mineral right. Article 154 of the Mineral Code declares that one who
"establishes corporeal possession of land as owner under an act tran-
slative of title is in possession of the rights in minerals inherent in
perfect ownership of land except to the extent mineral rights are reserved
in the act or the act is expressly made subject to outstanding mineral
rights." Further, Article 155 of the same Code declares that a "possessor
of land as owner without title possesses the mineral rights inherent in
perfect ownership of land."
133. See La. Civ. Code art. 3448; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 53, at § 163. According
to well-settled French doctrine and jurisprudence, an adverse possessor of the servient
estate, with or without title, does not possess a servitude adversely to the owner of the
dominant estate. Therefore, an adverse possessor of the servient estate in good faith and
under a just title that does not disclose a servitude may acquire the ownership of the
servient estate in ten or twenty years but subject to the servitude. See 3 M. Planiol et
G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 978; 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 theorique et pratique de
droit civil 890 (3d ed. Chauveau 1905). An adverse possessor of the servient estate may
acquire its ownership free of servitudes by the effect of the prescription of nonuse, which,
in France, is thirty years.
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VICES OF POSSESSION
Notion and Terminology
According to civilian conceptions, possession may be affected by
certain vices that exclude possessory protection and prevent the running
of acquisitive prescription in favor of the possessor. 3 4 A vice of pos-
session is an attribute which, without being a cause of termination of
possession, deprives the possessor of the two principal advantages of
possession.
In Louisiana and in France, the vices of possession are four: violence,
clandestinity, discontinuity, and equivocality.' In accord, Article 3435
of the Louisiana Civil Code declares: "Possession that is violent, clan-
destine, discontinuous, or equivocal has no legal effect."'1
36
Courts and commentators occasionally refer to the vice of precar-
iousness. It ought to be clear, however, that under a proper under-
standing of the provisions of the Civil Code precariousness is not a vice
of possession. Precarious possession does not lead to acquisitive pre-
scription, and it is not fully protected by the possessory action; but this
is so because precarious possession is detention rather than possession.
Article 3476 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that, for purposes
of acquisitive prescription, the possession must be "continuous, unin-
terrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal." This provision tracks
the language of Article 3487 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and
lumps together interruption of possession and vices of possession.1
37 It
ought to be clear, however, that the interruption of possession is not
a vice but the loss of the right to possess. 138
134. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 169; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau,
supra note 73 at 130. It is possession free of vice that leads to acquisitive prescription
and is protected by the possessory action. See La. Civ. Code art. 3476 para. 2; La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3658(2).
135. 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 169; La. Civ. Code art. 3435; cf.
C. Civ. art. 2229 (Fr.).
136. La. Civ. Code art. 3435. Cf. La. Civ. Code arts. 3487(2), 3491 (1870); C. Civ.
art. 2229 (Fr.).
137. See La. Civ. Code art. 3487 (1870); C. Civ. art. 2229 (Fr.).
138. See La. Civ. Code art. 3434 para 2. La. Civ. Code art. 3476 comment (c) states
that the requirements that the possession "be continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public,
and unequivocal, restate the rule that, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, the pos-
session must be free of vice." The requirement of uninterrupted possession, however, is
not a requirement for possession free of vice. It is instead a requirement for the existence
of possession. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 725.
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Violence
In Roman law, possession was affected by the vice of violence when
it was acquired by force. 39 There was no requirement that possession
be maintained without violence in order to qualify for possessory pro-
tection or acquisitive prescription. The possession could be freed of the
vice of violence only by the restoration of the property to the lawful
owner or possessor.
Article 3491 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, corresponding
with Article 2233 of the French Civil Code, declared: "A possession by
violence, not being legal, does not confer the right of prescribing. That
right only commences when the violence has ceased."' 4 On the basis
of this provision, argument could be made that possession was not
violent when it was merely maintained by violent acts.' 4' According to
the prevailing view in France, however, possession is violent when it is
acquired and maintained by violent acts. 42 Following this view, Article
3436 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that possession is violent
"when it is acquired or maintained by violent acts.' ' 4  The possession
is freed of the vice when the violence ceases. From that moment,
acquisitive prescription commences to run and one year later the pos-
sessor acquires the right to possess.'"
The vice of violence is relative. When a person evicts another with
violent acts and commences to possess for himself, his possession is
violent towards the former possessor. However, the same person's pos-
session is not violent towards the owner of the property or towards a
third person who was not exposed to the violent acts. 14
139. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 171.
140. La. Civ. Code art. 3491 (1870); C. Civ. art. 2233 (Fr.). Louisiana decisions under
the regime of the 1870 Code did not elaborate on violence as a vice of possession. Cf.
Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975). For French
decisions, see Cass. Req. May 10, 1865, D.P.I. 1865.1.411, S. 1865.1.264; Civ. Cass.
August 26, 1884, D.P.I. 1885.1.159, S. 1886.1.165.
141. See 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 138: "Possession free of vice in
its inception ... is not affected by vice merely because the possessor resorts to violence
in order to maintain his possession." See also Symeonides, supra note 2, at 93.
142. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 93; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at
137; 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 171.
143. La. Civ. Code art. 3436. The disjunctive "or" gives rise to an argument that a
possession peaceful in its inception becomes violent when it is maintained by violent acts.
See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 93. It would seem, however, that the intent of the
Louisiana legislature was to follow the interpretation that French courts and commentators
had given to Article 2233 of the French Civil Code and that the use of the disjunctive
"or" instead of the conjunctive "and" was an inadvertence.
144. For acquisition of the right to possess, Article 3658(2) of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure requires that the possession be exercised "quietly." For acquisitive pre-
scription, Article 3476 of the Louisiana Civil Code requires that the possession be "peace-
able." The words "quietly" and "peaceable" have the same meaning; they refer to a
possession that is free of the vice of violence.
145. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 171.
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Clandestinity
In order to be legally effective, one's possession must be open or
public.'"4 The possessor must act as a person would act who has the
right that the possessor claims to exercise. If the possessor seeks to hide
his acts from those who would have an interest to know, his possession
is clandestine. 47
The vice of clandestinity is, like violence, relative. Possession may
be clandestine as to some persons and public as to others to whom the
acts of possession have been revealed. Further, like violence, clandestinity
is a temporary vice of possession. As soon as the possessor commences
to possess publicly, his possession is freed of the vice.
Clandestinity is mostly pertinent for movables. With respect to im-
movables, it is hardly possible for any person to exercise factual authority
without being seen.'" In French jurisprudence, the classical example is
of a person who dug a cave under neighboring property with extreme
precautions and without any exterior sign of the encroachment, such as
a ventilator.' 49
A possession that was public at its inception does not become
clandestine if the possessor ceases to perform observable acts of corporeal
possession. Such a situation may be merely indicative of civil possession.
However, according to one view, possession becomes clandestine if the
possessor take extra-ordinary precautions to hide the continued exercise
of acts of use, detention, or enjoyment. 50
Discontinuity
In order to be legally effective, possession must be continuous. 5 '
Discontinuity is a vice of possession that excludes both possessory pro-
tection and acquisitive prescription.'52
146. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3435, 3436; C. Civ. art. 2229 (Fr.). See also 2 C. Aubry
et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 136; 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 173.
147. See La. Civ. Code art. 3436: "Possession is clandestine when it is not open or
public .... For acquisitive prescription, Article 3476 requires that the possession be
"public." In the fields of possession and prescription, the words "open" and "public"
have the same meaning; they refer to a possession that is not clandestine.
148. Cf. James Harvey Ramsey Estate, Inc. v. Pace, 467 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 2d
Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 918 (1985).
149. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 173.
150. See 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 137.
151. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3435, 3436, 3476; id. art. 3487 (1870); 3 M. Planiol et
G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 171.
152. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3435-3436, 3476; id. art. 3487 (1870); 3 M. Planiol et
G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 171. Cf. James Harvey Ramsey Estate, Inc. v. Pace, 467 So.
2d 1202 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 918 (1985) (the court declared the
occasional cutting of timber in isolated woodland is not continuous possession.); see also
Romar v. Estate of Gay, 454 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (cutting of logs for
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Article 3436 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that possession is
discontinuous "when it is not exercised at regular intervals. . .."I
Continuity consists in successive acts of use, detention, or enjoyment
at regular intervals that are sufficiently short to constitute proof of
abandonment of possession. The law does not require the exercise of
corporeal possession at all times; civil possession suffices for the main-
tenance of possession.5 4
There is an apparent conflict between the notion of civil possession
and the requirement that possession be continuous. According to Article
3431 of the Louisiana Civil Code, possession is retained by the intent
to possess as owner, and according to Article 3432, this intent is pre-
sumed in the absence of proof of a contrary intention. However, Article
3435 declares that discontinuous possession, namely, possession that is
not exercised at regular intervals, has no legal effect, and Article 3476
declares that, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, the possession
must be continuous. Properly understood, the two sets of provisions
are fully reconcilable. In the first place, continuity of possession is more
significant in cases involving the issue of whether possession has been
acquired rather than retained. Second, depending on the nature of the
property, long intervals in the exercise of possession may constitute
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of retention of possession.
The question of continuity of possession is one of fact, resolved in
light of the nature of the property that is being possessed. If, according
to its nature, the property is used every season or even every other
year, the possession is continuous."' In the words of the French Court
of Cassation, the possession is continuous "when it is exercised on all
occasions and at all times that it should be exercised. '1 56
Article 3443 of the Louisiana Civil Code, corresponding with Article
2234 of the French Civil Code, establishes a rebuttable presumption in
favor of a possessor who proves that he had possession at different
times; such a possessor is "presumed to have possessed during the
three months duration in 1963, 1964, and 1965, not continuous possession of timber
lands); cf. Oliver v. Kennington, 458 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 460
So. 2d 610 (1984); (the court held that the occasional cutting of timber from an isolated
tract of land is not proof of actual possession as owner.).
153. La. Civ. Code art. 3436.
154. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424, 3431, 3476; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3660; Parkway
Dev. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 342 So. 2d 151 (La. 1977).
155. Cf. Louisiana Irrigation and Mill Co. v. Pousson, 262 La. 973, 265 So. 2d 756
(1972). In this case, the defendant in a possessory action had possessed a rice irrigation
canal servitude in 1967 and 1968 during the irrigation season only, namely, from March
through July. The court held that possession during the irrigation season was the only
kind of possession of which the servitude was susceptible.
156. Cass. Req. June 5, 1839, S. 39.1.621, quoted in 3 M. Planiol et 0. Ripert, supra
note 9, at 171.
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intermediate period." This is not a presumption that one's possession
is free of the vice of discontinuity. It is instead a presumption that
one's possession has not been interrupted. 51
Equivocality
Equivocality is a vice of possession that renders possession legally
ineffective.' Article 3436 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that
possession is equivocal "when there is ambiguity as to the intent of the
possessor to own the thing."' 5 9
Generally, a person's possession is equivocal when his acts of use,
detention, or enjoyment of the thing are susceptible of more than one
explanation. This is often the case when property is held in indivision
and one of the co-owners exercises corporeal possession over the entire
property. His acts may be explained as constituting possession of his
share and detention of the property on behalf of the co-owners. The
same acts, however, may also be explained as constituting adverse pos-
session of the entire property. In order to minimize the ambiguity,
Article 3439 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that a co-owner
commences to possess for himself when he demonstrates his intent by
overt and unambiguous acts that are sufficient to give notice to his co-
owners.1'6 Possession is also equivocal when objects of value belonging
to the succession of a deceased person are found in the custody of an
heir or a servant who shared a residence with the deceased. 61
Aubry and Rau maintained that equivocality is not a distinct vice
of possession but the doubt that may surround, either the existence of
possession or one of the requisites for a legally effective possession,
such as continuity. In their words, "every time the word equivocal is
used, one of the necessary elements of possession is missing so that
either there is no possession at all or the existence of possession is in
doubt."' 62 For example, if the claim of a co-owner for exclusive pos-
session of the property held in common is rejected, it is because the
possession of his co-owners is established and not because the co-owner's
157. See 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 491; 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert,
supra note 9, at 726.
158. See La. Civ. Code art. 3435; C. Civ. art. 2229 (Fr.).
159. La. Civ. Code art. 3436. See also New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, Inc., 412
So. 2d 975 (La. 1981), rev'd on reh'g (1982). See also Trahan v. Broussard, 459 So. 2d
210, 213 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (the court held that "a possession manifested only by
the passing over unfenced land is equivocal in the highest degree").
160. See La. Civ. Code art. 3439; see also id. art. 3478.
161. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 174. For the possession of
property by one of the spouses under the community property regime, see Hargrave,
supra note 43, at 465-69.
162. See 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau, supra note 73, at 139.
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possession is equivocal. According to this view, the matter of equivocality
is reduced to a question of proof; the requirement that the requisites
for a legally effective possession be certain merely means that these
requisites must be proven.
Marcel Planiol has eloquently criticized this view and has convinc-
ingly demonstrated that when possession is equivocal the doubt bears
upon one of its constituent elements, the intent to possess as owner, 16 3
and not upon one of the secondary requisites for a legally effective
possession. It is only when the intent to possess as owner is in doubt
that the possession is equivocal.
PRECARIOUS POSSESSION
Notion and Effects
Article 3437 of the Louisiana Civil Code defines precarious posses-
sion as the "exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of
or on behalf of the owner or possessor. . . ."164 The definition indicates
the difference between possession in the proper sense of the word and
precarious possession, that is, detention.'65 A possessor is one who
possesses as owner, whereas a precarious possessor or detainer is one
who exercises factual authority over a thing with the permission of or
on behalf of another person.'"6
The term "precarious possession" derives from Roman sources. The
Roman precarium, however, was a special contract whereby an owner
ceded the possession or enjoyment of a thing to another person under
the condition of free revocability. l 7 The precarious possessor had a
veritable possession that was protected by possessory interdicts against
anyone except the grantor. The legal position of a detainer under the
163. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 174.
164. La. Civ. Code art. 3437; La. Civ. Code 3426 (1870); C. Civ. art. 2228 (Fr.).
165. See La. Civ. Code art. 3437 comment (b). A precarious possessor is called in
France possesseur precaire or detenteur. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at
175. Detention is also known as possessio naturalis in civilian sources. Id. The words
"natural possession" were used in Articles 3428 and 3430 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870.
166. The distinction between possession and detention figures prominently in the doc-
trinal debate between Savigny and Jhering. According to Savigny, a detainer is not a
possessor because he lacks the intent to possess as owner. According to Jhering, intent
alone cannot play a decisive role. A possessor has the same intent to possess as a detainer;
the difference between the two is found in the negative function of the causa possessionis,
that is, the existence of an agreement or a provision of law that qualifies a possessor as
detainer on behalf of another person. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15; 3 M.
Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 175.
167. See B. Schmidlin et C. Cannata, Droit Priv6 Romain 146 (1984).
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Louisiana Civil Code is quite different. However, like a precarious
possessor under the Roman law, the possessory action is available to a
Louisiana precarious possessor against anyone except the person for
whom he possesses. 6s It is also possible for a person to be a precarious
possessor in Louisiana in the Roman sense of the word. This happens,
for example, when a landowner permits another person to occupy his
land gratuitously for a term or until revocation of the license.' 69
The vice of precarious possession is relative. Thus, one's possession
may be precarious vis-a-vis the owner who has tacitly or expressly given
permission for the use of his land and adverse toward third persons. 70
In contrast with possession, which may be grounded on unauthorized
taking, precarious possession is always founded on a juridical act or a
provision of law that implies the recognition of another person's pos-
session or ownership. Property is placed under the control of a precarious
possessor for a certain purpose and the precarious possessor is bound
by an obligation to restore the property to the person for whom he
possesses.
Among the precarious possessors are included co-owners, lessees,
and tenant farmers to whom property has been delivered under a contract
of lease, pledgees of corporeal movables under a contract of pawn,
depositaries having in their custody things under the laws governing
deposit and sequestration, borrowers under a contract of loan for use,
and administrators of another's property, such as mandataries, tutors,
and curators.' 7 The enumeration is merely illustrative of persons who
exercise acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a thing under a title
that implies the ownership of another person. 17 2 Persons who have a
real right on the property of another person, such as a personal servitude
or a predial servitude, have a double status. They are possessors of the
168. See La. Civ. Code art. 3440. A precarious possessor may not be plaintiff in a
possessory action brought against the person for whom he possesses. Caruthers v. Ca-
ruthers, 484 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
169. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2893, 2894, 2906, 2907. See also Falgoust v. Innes, 163
So. 429 (La. App. Orl. 1935). For French jurisprudence, see 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert,
supra note 9, at 176.
170. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 941; Cass. civ. Ire March 6,
1855, D.P.I. 1855.1.83, S. 1855.1.507; Cass. Req. January 3, 1877, D.P.I. 1877.1.14. But
see 25 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Trait6 th6orique et pratique de droit civil 221 (3d ed. Tissier
1906).
171. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2669, 2893, 2926, 3154, 3439, 3478; 3 M. Planiol et G.
Ripert, supra note 9, at 177.
172. For example, a co-owner possesses his share for himself and the property pre-
cariously for his co-owners. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3439, 3478. Courts have held that
a vendor who retains possession of the thing sold is a precarious possessor toward the
vendee. Frost Lumber Industries, Inc. v. Harrison, 215 La. 767, 41 So. 2d 674 (1949);
Roe v. Bundy's Heirs, 45 La. Ann 398, 12 So. 759 (1893); James Harvey Ramsey Estate,
Inc. v. Pace, 467 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 918 (1985).
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real right and precarious possessors of the property that is burdened
with the real right.
When a thing is under the control of a precarious possessor, its
possession belongs to the person for whom the precarious possessor
possesses. The precarious possessor enjoys none of the rights attributed
to possessors, 173 with the exception of the right to institute a possessory
action against anyone except the person for whom he possesses. 17 4 Thus,
a lessee may not bring a possessory action against the lessor. When a
precarious possessor institutes a possessory action against a third person,
the judgment does not have the effect of res judicata vis-a-vis the person
for whom the precarious possessor possesses, unless the latter has been
made a party to the proceedings. 75
Legal Presumptions
The distinction between possession and detention carries significant
legal consequences, but the proof that a person possesses as owner or
in the name of another person is difficult to establish. Therefore, Articles
3427 and 3438 of the Louisiana Civil Code contain rules intended to
minimize the difficulty of proof.
Article 3427 declares that "one is presumed to intend to possess as
owner unless he began to possess in the name of and for another. 1'76
A person who exercises factual authority over property may rely on this
presumption and opt not to introduce any evidence as to his intent to
possess as owner. However, this presumption may be rebutted on proof
that the person who exercises factual authority is a precarious possessor
or no possessor at all. 7 7 When there is proof that the possession was
173. See La. Civ. Code art. 3423. Acquisitive prescription does not run in favor of
a precarious possessor. La. Civ. Code art. 3477. He has no claim for the fruits of the
property and is not entitled to reimbursement for expenses or improvements as a good
or bad faith possessor. See La. Civ. Code arts. 486, 488, 527-529.
174. -See La. Civ. Code art. 3440. A precarious possessor may not be plaintiff in a
possessory action brought against the person for whom he possesses. Caruthers v. Ca-
ruthers, 484 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986). Under modern civil codes, possessory
protection is available to a precarious possessor for the protection of his detention vis-
a-vis third persons. See, e.g., Greek Civ. Code art. 997. In France, two articles were
added to the Civil Code in 1975 in order to accord possessory protection to precarious
possessors. See C. Civ. arts. 2282, 2283 (Fr.).
175. See La. R.S. 13:4231; La. Civ. Code art. 3440 comment (d).
176. See La. Civ. Code art. 3427; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Landry, 558 So. 2d 242
(La. 1990); Williams v. McEacharn, 464 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Freeman v.
Williams, 450 So. 2d 1030 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
177. See Levy v. Germania Plantation, Inc., 395 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
Occasionally, a party's own admissions rebut the presumption of the intent to possess as
owner. See Briggs v. Pellerin, 428 So. 2d 1087 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). However, a
declaration against interest after accrual of the acquisitive prescription was held insufficient
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precarious at its inception, the presumption set forth in Article 3427 of
the Civil Code does not arise.17 1
Article 3438 declares that a precarious possessor, such as a lessee
or a depositary, "is presumed to possess for another although he may
intend to possess for himself." Once there is proof that the possession
was precarious at its inception, the possession is presumed to be for
another even if the precarious possessor has changed his mind and
intends to possess as owner. He may not rely on the presumption of
Article 3427, but he may rebut the presumption of precariousness in
accordance with Articles 3439 and 3478 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, a co-owner
as well as any other precarious possessor could rebut the presumption
of precariousness on proof that he had commenced to possess for himself
by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice of his intent
to the person for whom he possessed. 7 9 There is no change in the law
in so far as co-owners are concerned. All other precarious possessors,
however, must give actual notice that they intend to possess as owners. 80
Termination of Precarious Possession
Precarious possession may last indefinitely.' The obligation of a
precarious possessor to restore the property is heritable, 8 2 and the uni-
versal successors continue the possession of the deceased without any
to rebut the presumption of the intent to possess as owner. Williams v. McEacharn, 464
So. 2d 20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). In Comeaux v. Davenport, 452 So. 2d 818 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1984), plaintiff signed a lease from the record owners of the disputed property,
after having possessed it adversely as owner for 23 years. Had this lease been valid, it
would have constituted an acknowledgment capable of rendering subsequent possession
precarious. However, after expressing "serious misgivings regarding the validity of plain-
tiff's consent" because he could not read and did not know what he was signing, the
court declared the lease invalid because, of the two co-owners named as lessors in the
lease document, only one had signed it.
178. In Harvill v. Casey, 461 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 464
So. 2d 318 (1985), the presumption did not arise because the person claiming possession
was a relative who had possessed for himself and his co-owners. In Chaney v. State
Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105 (La. 1983), plaintiff failed to prove acts of corporeal
possession. Hence, they could not rely on the presumption of Article 3427 of the Louisiana
Civil Code.
179. See Hammond v. Averett, 415 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Champagne
v. Broussard, 401 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Symeonides, supra note 2, at
85-87.
180. See La. Civ. Code art. 3439(2), 3478(2).
181. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 178. It may last "even for one
thousand years" (etiam per mille annos) said Demoulin. Id.
182. Cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1765.
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change of its nature and qualities. 18 3 The possession of the universal
successors is precarious even if they are ignorant of the obligation to
restore the property and believe that they possess as owners.
18 4
Precarious possession, however, may terminate. The precarious pos-
sessor may convey the property to successors by particular title, that
is, persons such as purchasers, or he may commence to possess as
owner. When a precarious possessor conveys the property by particular
title, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, the transferee possesses as
owner. 5 This is an application of the principle that a transferee by
particular title is not bound by the personal obligations of the trans-
feror. 16
A precarious possessor may commence to possess for himself as
provided in Articles 3439 and 3478 of the Louisiana Civil Code. These
articles draw a distinction between co-owners and all other precarious
possessors. A co-owner commences to possess the entire property for
himself when he demonstrates his intent by overt and unambiguous acts
that are sufficient to give notice to his co-owners. 8 7 The acquisition
and recordation of a title to the property from a third person may
mark the termination of a co-owner's precarious possession. 88 For pur-
poses of Articles 3439 and 3478 of the Civil Code, the requisite title
need not meet the requirements of Article 3483 of the Civil Code,
namely, the title need not be an act translative of ownership. Thus, the
recordation of an act of partition,8 9 a donation invalid as to form, 19°
a simulated sale, 19' and the recordation of an ex parte judgment of
183. See La. Civ. Code art. 3441; id. art. 3656(28).
184. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 179.
185. See La. Civ. Code art. 3479. See also Jordan v. Richards, 114 La. 329, 38 So.
206 (1905); Allen v. Paggi Bros. Oil Co., 244 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
186. See La. Civ. Code art. 3556(28).
187. See La. Civ. Code art. 3439(1); id. art. 3478(1). Franks Petroleum, Inc. v.
Babineaux, 446 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984). A mere occupancy, use, payment
of taxes will not suffice to constitate notice of adverse possession. See also Headrick v.
Lee, 471 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985). Nor is a co-owner's redemption of the
common property an act of adverse possession. Boase v. Edmonson, 471 So. 2d 847 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1985).
188. See La. Civ. Code art. 3478(1). In Towles v. Heirs of Morrison, 428 So. 2d
1029 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), the precarious possessor (co-owner) overcame the pre-
sumption that he was possessing precariously the land of his co-owner by recording a
deed translative of title which purported to convey to him the land of his co-owner. See
also General American Oil Co. of Texas v. Williams, Inc., 441 So. 2d 1268 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 445 So. 2d 1230 (1984).
189. See Dupuis v. Broadhurst, 213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Minton v.
Whitworth, 393 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
190. See Givens v. Givens, 273 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 275 So.
2d 868 (1973).
191. See Detraz v. Pere, 183 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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possession for the entire property rather than a share in indivision,192
have been held sufficient to mark the commencement of a co-owner's
possession of the entire property.
A precarious possessor other than a co-owner commences to possess
for himself when he gives actual notice to the person on whose behalf
he is possessing that he intends to possess for himself. 93 Under the
regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, such a precarious possessor
could commence for himself when he acquired title to the property from
a third person.'9 It is doubtful that this is so under the 1982 revision.
Article 3478 of the Civil Code declares that a co-owner may commence
to possess for himself when he acquires a title to the property from a
person other than a co-owner but both Article 3478 and Article 3439
require possessors other than co-owners to give actual notice of their
intent to possess as owners. 95 However, the words "actual notice" have
not been defined in the Civil Code and argument may be made that
the acquisition and recordation of a title to the property from a third
person constitutes actual notice to the person for whom the precarious
possessor had possessed the property.
TRANSFER, TACKING AND PROOF OF NON-INTERRUPTED POSSESSION
Transfer of Possession
Article 3441 of the Louisiana Civil Code declares that possession,
that is, the factual authority that a person exercises over a thing, is
transferable by universal title or by particular title.' 96 There is no pro-
vision referring expressly to the transferability of the right to possess.
This right is heritable and transferable in the same manner as other
property rights.
192. See Franks Petroleum, Inc. v. Babineaux, 446 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1984).
193. See La. Civ. Code art. 3439(2), 3478(2). The precarious possessor commences to
possess adversely from the time he gives notice and acquires the right to possess one year
later. See Satsuma Pentecostal Church v. Harris, 563 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1990). See also Morris v. Sonnier, 546 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (no actual
notice given).
194. See La. Civ. Code art. 3512 (1870).
195. For critical observations, see Symeonides, supra note 2, at 87. There was no
requirement of actual notice under the regime of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Id.
See also Succession of Zebriska, 119 La. 1076, 44 So. 893 (1907); Thompson's Succession
v. Cyprian, 34 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948).
196. See La. Civ. Code art. 3441; id. arts. 3493, 3494, 3496 (1870); C. Civ. art. 2235
(Fr.). For the distinction between succession by universal title and succession by particular
title, see La. Civ. Code art. 3556(28).
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A universal title implies, necessarily, succession mortis causa. In
Louisiana, the possession of a deceased person is transferred by operation
of law or by his will to universal successors, that is, heirs, universal
legatees, or legatees under universal title,' 97 who continue the possession
of the deceased without any change in its nature and qualities. Thus,
if the possession of the deceased was precarious or in bad faith, the
possession of the universal successors is precarious and in bad faith.
However, if the decedent's possession was civil, nothing prevents the
universal successors from exercising corporeal possession; and, if the
decedent's possession was corporeal, the possession of the universal
successors may be civil.
In Louisiana, the possession of a deceased person is not transferred
directly to particular successors, that is, legatees under particular title.
It is the duty of the universal successors of the deceased to place the
particular legatees in possession of the property that the testator be-
queathed to them. A particular title may be either an act inter vivos
or an act mortis causa. For the transfer of possession, the title need
not be translative of ownership; an act designed to transfer possession
suffices.
A successor by particular title does not continue the possession of
his ancestor in title and his possession may be of a different nature.
For example, if the ancestor was a precarious possessor or a possessor
in bad faith, the particular successor may possess for himself and be
in good faith. 98
Tacking of Possession
A possessor, in order to meet the requirements for acquisition of
the right to possess and for acquisitive prescription, may add his pos-
session to that of his ancestor in title. This is called tacking of poss-
essions.'9 Article 3442 of the Louisiana Civil Code, corresponding with
Article 2235 of the French Civil Code, declares that the possession of
the transferor is tacked to that of the transferee if there has been no
interruption of possession.
Strictly speaking, tacking takes place only in cases of succession by
particular title. In cases of universal succession, the universal successors
continue the possession of the deceased without any change in its nature
and qualities. It has been aptly said that, in such a case, "there is only
197. For discussion, see A. Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes § 10, in 3 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (3d ed 1989).
198. See La. Civ. Code art. 3479.
199. See Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982); Note, A Restricted Application
of Civil Code Article 3482: Bartlett v. Calhoun, 43 La. L. Rev. 1221 (1983); Symeonides,
supra note 2, at 102.
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one possession which is continued by the heirs rather than two poss-
essions which need to be joined." 2°° Nevertheless, Louisiana legal texts
characteristically speak of tacking in" cases of universal succession. 2°1
Ordinarily, the tacking of possessions requires a juridical link, that
is, an act sufficient to transfer possession or ownership. It is by virtue
of such a link that the possession of the successor is tacked to the
possession of his ancestor in title. Exceptionally, tacking is permitted
without a juridical link in cases falling under Article 794 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. If a party and his ancestors in title possessed for thirty
years without interruption, within visible bounds, more land than their
title called for, the boundary is fixed along these bounds despite the
non-existence of a juridical link as to the part of the land that lies
beyond the limits of the possessor's title.
Civil possession may be tacked to corporeal possession, 202 and vice
versa, because both kinds of possession suffice for acquisition of the
right to possess and for acquisitive prescription. 23 Good faith possession
may be tacked to good faith possession, and bad faith possession may
be tacked to bad faith possession. However, a good faith successor may
not tack his possession to the bad faith possession of his ancestor in
order to meet the requirements for good faith acquisitive prescription,
and neither can a bad faith successor tack to the good faith possession
of his ancestor for the completion of good faith prescription.2 A good
faith possessor may tack to the bad faith possession of his ancestor in
order to meet the requirements for bad faith acquisitive prescription,
and a bad faith possessor may also tack to the good faith possession
of his ancestor in order to meet the requirements for bad faith pre-
scription.
One may hardly speak of tacking in the framework of precarious
possession. A precarious possessor may not convert his detention into
possession by tacking to the possession of his ancestor, and a possessor
who possesses as owner has nothing to gain from tacking to the pre-
carious possession of his ancestor.
Presumption of Non-interrupted Possession
In order to be legally effective, possession must be continuous 7 5
200. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 105.
201. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 3442 comment (b).
202. See Ellis v. Prevost, 19 La. 251 (1841). See also La. Civ. Code art. 3424 comment
(c); La. Code Civ. P. art. 3660.
203. See La. Civ. Code art. 3476; La. Code Civ. P. art. 3660. It is, of course,
understood that possession must be corporeal at its inception. Id.
204. See Bartlett v. Calhoun, 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982); Note, supra note 199. For
critical discussion, see also Symeonides, supra note 2, at 102-03.
205. For the vice of discontinuity, see La. Civ. Code arts. 3436, 3476.
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and uninterrupted.m Yet, it frequently would be an impossible task for
any possessor to prove that he was in possession at all times. In order
to alleviate difficulties of proof, Article 3443 of the Louisiana Civil
Code declares that a person who proves that he had possession at
different times "is presumed to have possessed during the intermediate
period. ' '207 This is a rebuttable presumption that one's possession has
not been interrupted. It is not a presumption that the possession is free
of the vice of discontinuity.2
206. For interruption of possession, see La. Civ. Code art. 3434. For interruption of
prescription, see La. Civ. Code art. 3465; cf. id. art. 3476.
207. La. Civ. Code art. 3443; C. Civ. art. 2234 (Fr.); 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert,
supra note 9, at 726.
208. See 3 M. Planiol et G. Ripert, supra note 9, at 726; 2 C. Aubry et C. Rau,
supra note 73, at 490.
